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“Two Negroes were taken from…custody…as they were being returned to 
jail…After they were seized the mob tortured their victims by searing their flesh 
with blasts from gasoline blow torches. After thus brutally burning them, the wild 
mob piled brush high about them, saturated the brush with gasoline, and touched 
a match to the pyre.” This description of the horrifying death of two African 
Americans at the hands of a lynch mob in Duck Hill, Mississippi, while the House 
of Representatives debated the merits of the 1937 Gavagan anti-lynching bill, was 
read to the chamber from a newswire report. It galvanised the House to pass the 
bill two days later.1 The bill’s passage proved to be the peak of a decades-long 
campaign for federal anti-lynching legislation, spearheaded by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 
Lynching derives its name from an unidentified ‘Judge Lynch’ of 
revolutionary-era Virginia, who allegedly meted out summary justice to Tory 
plotters.2 Over time, the practice came to primarily refer to often-lethal mob 
vigilantism directed against African Americans in the southern states. 
Campaigners for anti-lynching legislation sought for the federal government to 
act to prevent the violation of two of the most basic tenets of American 
                                                 
1 Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 1st Session, 3434, 3563 
2 Christopher Waldrep, The Many Faces of Judge Lynch, (New York, 2002), 15 
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democracy, the right to life and right to due process. The government’s refusal to 
enact this legislation during the New Deal makes clear the difficulties African 
Americans confronted when seeking change within the American political 
system.  
The various anti-lynching bills considered by Congress in the 1930s were 
the only civil rights measures it dealt with during the decade, a period that saw 
great change in many other areas of American life, as labour relations and 
business regulation were revolutionised and a welfare system established, for 
instance. At a time when the federal government was extending its reach into new 
aspects of its citizens’ lives, it refused to enact a law to allow federal agencies to 
step in when a state failed to provide its citizens with their constitutional rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The House of Representatives passed 
an NAACP-sponsored bill in 1937, but despite the professed support of a majority 
of senators, Senate filibusters were allowed to kill the measure in both 1934-35 
and 1937-38. 
Studies of the campaign for federal action against lynching have tended to 
focus on either the role of pressure groups such as the NAACP and the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL), or 
have discussed the failure to pass a federal anti-lynching law as part of a broader 
analysis of the Roosevelt administration’s record towards African Americans.3 
One article focuses on the politics behind southern opposition to federal 
                                                 
3 Robert Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950, 
(Philadelphia, 1980); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s 
Campaign Against Lynching, (New York, 1979); Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the 
Party of Lincoln, (Princeton, 1983), chapters 5 and 11; Harvard Sitkoff, A New 
Deal for Blacks, (New York, 1978), chapter 11 
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legislation.4 While this necessarily entailed some discussion of congressional 
politics, there has been no in-depth study of why, time after time, proposed 
legislation failed to get through Congress. Cursory examinations lay the blame 
with the southern Democrat opponents of any civil rights measures, or, by 
focusing on President Roosevelt, suggest that his failure to endorse any of the 
measures proposed during his administration was the key factor. 
 This study looks at how and why the anti-lynching bills of the New Deal 
years were passed by the House against the wishes of that chamber’s supposedly 
strong leadership, but failed to overcome minority opposition in the Senate. It 
first examines the social and political climate in which lynching—and anti-
lynching—became a significant issue during the years of New Deal reform, before 
analysing the specific circumstances that led to the bills’ contrasting fate in the 
two houses of Congress. 
Lynching gradually declined over the next two decades without federal 
action, although the NAACP continued its fight for federal legislation until 1950. 
No bill ever came close to passing after 1938, however, and for over 20 years the 
Association, and the African-American civil rights movement more broadly, 
shifted its strategy for accomplishing meaningful change away from legislative 
action.  
In the 1930s, the still-emerging African-American vote was too weak to 
induce the largely indifferent leaderships of both parties to make anything more 
than a lacklustre attempt to overcome highly motivated congressional opponents. 
                                                 
4 George Rable, ‘The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-
1940,’ Journal of Southern History, (May, 1985), 51(2):201-220 
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Given the institutional impediments faced by civil rights measures in the Senate, 











In 1933, at the beginning of a period of profound change in the United 
States, the NAACP launched its new campaign for federal anti-lynching 
legislation. The country was in the midst of an unprecedented economic 
catastrophe and a new president apparently committed to the ‘forgotten man’ 
was in the White House. He headed a newly united national Democratic coalition 
of urban liberals and rural conservatives from the south and west. 
 Federal anti-lynching legislation had been off the agenda for ten years, 
since the defeat of a bill introduced by Republican congressman Leonidas Dyer of 
Missouri in 1922. The Dyer bill, after having passed the Republican-controlled 
House, was blocked by the threat of a southern filibuster in the Senate. Over the 
next decade, the GOP made increasing overtures to the south, pushing yet further 
aside its historical commitment to civil rights. But as the Depression bit, 
campaigns by the NAACP and southern white liberals against a rise in mob 
violence helped to bring lynching more to the fore of the nation’s consciousness. 
 The reformist atmosphere of the New Deal gave hope to black leaders and 
race liberals that the Roosevelt administration would address the specific needs 
of African Americans. Individual states had traditionally been allowed to control 
their own race relations, but as the federal government assumed a greater role in 
its citizens’ lives during the New Deal, liberal reformers hoped to see this 
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change.5 Ultimately, though, the New Dealers’ focus always lay with economic 
recovery. Even when they did consider racial issues, it was within a framework 
that the “‘Negro problem’ was fundamentally a class problem and treated best by 
economic reform.”6 For some liberals, this attitude extended even to 
counteracting mob violence, which they expected would die out as opportunities 
for both whites and blacks improved.7 
There were 4,608 victims of lynching in the United States between 1882 
and 1932, of whom more than seven in ten were African Americans.8 From a high 
of 230 in 1892, the number of victims steadily decreased during the twentieth 
century, dropping below double figures for the first time in 1932. The next year, 
the Roosevelt administration’s first year in office, the number of lynchings soared 
to 28, with the rise possibly aggravated by the economic turmoil of the 
Depression.9 
Although lynching had occurred in almost every state in the continental 
United States, during the twentieth century it became an increasingly southern 
phenomenon, with overwhelmingly African American victims. Until the early 
1900s, lynchings were treated as local matters, and even particularly brutal cases 
barely made headline news. By the 1930s, anti-lynching campaigns had helped 
make it a more mainstream issue, increasingly commented on by the white press 
and in magazines such as the Nation and Literary Digest.10 The Duck Hill 
                                                 
5 Weiss, Farewell, 36-7 
6 John Kirby, Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era, (Knoxville, 1980), 232 
7 Morton Sosna, In Search of the Silent South, (New York, 1977), 31-33 
8 Statistics from Zangrando, NAACP, 6-7 
9 For a discussion of this link see ibid., 9-11 
10 Waldrep, Judge Lynch, 172; Hall, Revolt, 354-61 
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lynching—at the height of the House anti-lynching debate—made only page 52 of 
the New York Times, but page one of the African-American paper, the Chicago 
Defender.11 
A southern-based movement against lynching developed in the decades 
before the New Deal, as white southern liberals began to address some of the 
problems facing their region. The Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) 
was established in 1919 to promote interracial understanding. One of its main 
aims was to eliminate lynching.12 The CIC’s Southern Commission on the Study 
of Lynching published its findings in 1933 as Arthur Raper’s The Tragedy of 
Lynching and James Chadbourn’s Lynching and the Law, which educated a 
wider audience about mob violence. In 1930, the ASWPL was set up under the 
aegis of the CIC. This group of upper-class southern women aimed “to create a 
new public opinion in the South which will not condone for any reason the acts of 
mobs or lynchers.”13 Its founding was welcomed by the white and African-
American press, which seized upon the apparent shift in southern opinion.14  
These women, like most southern liberals, believed that change could only 
be effected from within the south, through education and the spread of more 
liberal values. For many years, these organisations, along with leading southern 
newspapers, refused to back federal legislation as a solution for lynching, 
believing that mob justice was best dealt with through white southerners’ own 
                                                 
11 New York Times, April 14, 1937, 52; Chicago Defender, April 17, 1937, 1 
12 Sosna, South, 20-41 
13 Sitkoff, New Deal, 274 
14 Hall, Revolt, 166 
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efforts.15 But by 1937, concerned with the south’s continued failure to protect 
victims and prosecute lynchers, most progressive papers had endorsed the latest 
anti-lynching bill.16 Nevertheless, the ASWPL continued to oppose it, with Jessie 
Daniel Ames, the organisation’s executive director, going so far as to write to one 
of the bill’s leading opponents—Senator Tom Connally (D—Texas)—in the midst 
of a Senate filibuster to congratulate him for his successful opposition: “It will be 
a great relief to the public to have that measure laid on the shelf in order that the 
Senate may go about important and far-reaching legislation.”17 
For the NAACP, an anti-lynching campaign was a good means of raising 
funds and awareness during the Depression decade, as its basic message was 
more palatable to potential white donors and apolitical African Americans than 
addressing the economic and political issues facing black Americans.18 Its success 
in raising awareness of lynching among the political classes during the 1930s is 
shown by the increase in anti-lynching measures put before Congress. Between 
1925 and 1932, no anti-lynching bills had been submitted, with two in 1933 and 
                                                 
15 George Fort Milton to White, January 31, 1935, I:C237, Records of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter ‘NAACP Papers’); Kenneth Janken, 
White: The Biography of Walter White, (New York: 2003), 206-7 
16 ‘For a Federal Antilynching Bill’, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1937, 
6 and ‘Federal Check on Lynching,’ Macon Telegraph, February 15, 1935, I:C427, 
NAACP Papers; George Tindall, The Emergence of the New South 1913-1945, 
(Baton Rouge, 1967), 552 
17 Ames to Connally, January 28, 1938, container 127, Tom Connally papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
18 Raymond Wolters, Negroes and the Great Depression, (Westport, CT, 1970), 
337; Philip Klinkner, The Unsteady March, (Chicago, 1999), 129-30 
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ten in 1934. In the 74th Congress (1935-1936), thirty-three such bills were 
proposed.19 
These bills faced a Congress of a very different complexion to the one that 
had considered Dyer’s bill. A raft of new Democratic congressmen came in on the 
coattails of Roosevelt’s landslide victory of 1932, giving the party a huge majority 
over the disorganised, unhappy, repudiated Republicans.20  
Before the New Deal, southerners had dominated the Democratic party. 
Between 1896 and the start of the New Deal, the party received only around 40 
percent of the popular vote in congressional and presidential elections outside 
the south, compared with a share of at least 86 percent in the south.21 The 
northern urban working-class and ethnic minorities had increasingly supported 
the Democrats since 1910, but Roosevelt was the first leader to unite these 
disparate wings into a national coalition. Nevertheless, southerners retained their 
dominant position, as they disproportionately chaired powerful congressional 
committees. 
The Democrats’ urban liberal wing eventually transformed the party into a 
vehicle for realising African Americans’ constitutional rights, straining the 
south’s historic ties to the party, but during the 1930s this process had only just 
begun. African Americans lagged behind other elements of the Roosevelt 
coalition in switching to the Democratic party and in 1932 maintained their 
traditional allegiance to the Republican party, despite the failure of the Hoover 
                                                 
19 Sitkoff, New Deal, 284 
20 James Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, (Lexington, 
1967), 5-7 
21 Ira Katznelson et al., ‘Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 
1933-1950,’ Political Science Quarterly, (Summer, 1993), 108(2):284 
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administration to deal with issues affecting black people. Roosevelt’s choice of 
running mate, Texas’s John Garner, did little to convince black voters that the 
Democrats offered any alternative to Hoover’s neglect. The 1932 election results 
show that the proportion of African Americans that joined the Roosevelt coalition 
was much smaller than of other minority groups. Not until 1936 did they vote in 
large numbers for the Democrats.22  
Black migration from the South, which began during World War I and was 
given only added impetus by the economic instability of the Depression, 
transformed the northern political scene, as African Americans became a 
significant electoral force. Between 1910 and 1940, the proportion of black people 
living outside the south increased from 10 to 23 percent.23 The number of black 
voters in the northern cities increased by 400,000 between 1930 and 1940, with 
the number of blacks registered to vote doubling, enough to hold the balance of 
power in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois.24 The 1934 midterm 
elections saw the first concerted efforts by Democrats to appeal to the northern 
black electorate, with some campaigning in African Americans areas for the first 
time. As black voter registration increased during the 1930s, so politicians 
increasingly paid at least lip service to their needs.25 
Southern congressmen greeted this with apprehension. “The catering by 
our National Party to the Negro vote,” Josiah Bailey (D—North Carolina) wrote,  
                                                 
22 Weiss, Farewell, 32, xiii 
23 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, (New York, 
1977), 190-92 
24 Anthony Badger, The New Deal, (New York: 1989), 252; Raymond Wolters, 
‘The New Deal and the Negro,’ in John Braeman et al. (eds.), The New Deal, 
(Columbus, 1975), 209 
25 Sitkoff, New Deal, 88 
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“is not only extremely distasteful to me, but very alarming to me. 
Southern people know what this means and you would have to be in 
Washington only about three weeks to realize what it is meaning to 
our Party in the Northern states. It is bringing it down to the lowest 
depths of degradation.”26 
 
A number of scholars point to Roosevelt’s failure ever to endorse any 
federal anti-lynching bill as the reason the various bills were never enacted. His 
first comments on lynching came only after California’s governor, James Rolph, 
praised the lynching of two white men who had confessed to a kidnap-murder in 
San Jose in November 1933 as  “the best lesson that California has ever given the 
country. We show the country that the state is not going to tolerate kidnapping.”27 
In the wake of the national outcry that greeted Rolph’s remarks, the president 
finally condemned lynching as a “vile form of collective murder” in a nationally 
broadcast address.28 
Nevertheless, in his message to the new session of Congress in January 
1934, Roosevelt made no proposal for federal anti-lynching legislation, merely 
grouping it with “organized banditry, cold-blooded shooting,” and kidnapping as 
crimes that “call on the strong arm of government for their immediate 
suppression”.29 He made no reference to its racial aspect. 
Roosevelt explained his unwillingness to endorse federal legislation 
against lynching to the NAACP’s executive secretary, Walter White, at a meeting 
                                                 
26 Bailey, March 1, 1938, quoted in James Patterson, ‘The Failure Party 
Realignment in the South, 1937-1939,’ Journal of Politics, (August, 1965), 
27(3):603 
27 Quotation from Walter White to Edward Costigan, Nov 27 1933, I:C233, 
NAACP Papers 
28 ‘President & God,’ Time, December 18, 1933 
29 Weiss, Farewell, 101 
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in May 1934. After the president had spent most of the conversation avoiding the 
issue, he told White that he was unwilling to challenge the southern Democrats:  
“I did not choose the tools with which I must work…Had I been 
permitted to choose them I would have selected quite different ones. 
But I’ve got to get legislation passed by Congress to save America. 
The Southerners by reason of the seniority rule in Congress are 
chairmen or occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and 
House committees. If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they 
will block every bill I ask Congress to pass to keep America from 
collapsing. I just can’t take that risk.”30 
 
White believed vocal support from the president would help convince 
wavering members of Congress to back federal legislation, and turn public 
opinion against obstructive senators.31 Behind the scenes, Roosevelt did make 
some effort to bring the bill to a vote, but he left his wife to be the face of the 
couple’s racial liberalism, which gave him a measure of distance from the issue 
without alienating African Americans. As a pragmatic politician above all else, he 
was not going to expend political capital on such contentious issues as anti-
lynching legislation. 
 Whether Roosevelt’s intervention would have been enough to force a bill 
through the Senate is debatable, as by 1938—when the anti-lynching bill came 
closest to passing—he had lost much of his ability to push through his priority 
legislation.32 While the economy appeared to be recovering, opposition to the 
administration was muted, but the ‘Roosevelt recession’ of 1937 undermined the 
administration’s claims to have returned the country to prosperity. The special 
session of Congress in November and December 1937 failed to pass any of the 
                                                 
30 Walter White, A Man Called White, (London, 1949), 169-70 
31 Fred Greenbaum, Fighting Progressive, (Washington, D.C., 1971), 174 
32 Weiss, Farewell, 246 
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president’s desired legislation: the farm bill, wages and hours legislation, 
executive reorganisation and regional planning.33 If he was unable to get the 
legislation he truly favoured passed, it is unlikely that he would have been the 
decisive factor in the anti-lynching fight, though his silence certainly did not help. 
The difficulties facing proponents of anti-lynching legislation also affected 
other legislation concerning African Americans. The need to attract the support 
of southern senators resulted in discriminatory clauses being written into much 
of the legislation enacted during the New Deal.34 Domestic and agricultural 
workers—black Americans’ main job categories—were excluded from the 
National Recovery Administration codes and Social Security.35 Conservative 
southerners opposed minimum-wage legislation because they feared its impact 
on the region’s competitive advantage. It also risked disrupting the southern 
economic and social structure by guaranteeing workers higher wages, making 
workers of all races less dependent on established white elites. They were 
successful in getting regional differentials written into the legislation. The list 
could easily go on.36 
 Not all of the New Deal’s efforts were discriminatory, and African 
Americans did receive some tangible benefits during the decade, not least the 
millions who were put to work or on relief, or who benefited from literacy classes 
                                                 
33 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, (New York, 1956), 
321 
34 The literature on this point is extensive. See Sitkoff, New Deal; Kirby, Black 
Americans; Weiss, Farewell; Wolters, Great Depression; Klinkner, Unsteady 
March 
35 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White, (New York, 2005), 43, 
56-7 
36 Katznelson, ‘Limiting Liberalism,’ 297 
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offered by the federal government.37 The level of racial discrimination in New 
Deal agencies largely depended on the attitude of their heads, and while FDR did 
nothing to change their attitudes, he appointed race liberals such as Harold Ickes, 
Will Alexander and Aubrey Williams to his administration. Where they could, 
these men, and the ‘Black Cabinet’ of African-American advisers, went some way 
to minimising the negative effects of the New Deal on America’s black 
population.38 
In the United States’ bicameral system of government, both houses of 
Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate—must pass a bill for it to 
become law. A bill’s passage through the two chambers is affected by the 
distinctly different politics of each house, much of which results from their 
different composition. The New Deal Senate was made up of 96 senators, two 
from each state, who all served a six-year term, with only a third of the seats at 
stake every two years. The House comprised 435 members, generally 
representing a district-level seat, all up for election every two years. The more 
concentrated electoral pressures on members of the House make them more 
parochial and more heavily influenced by local pressures than senators. 
Representatives almost always represent a smaller, more homogeneous electorate 
than senators, who answer to a more varied statewide constituency. 
A highly structured system of rules was set up to govern the House’s 
activities, which because of its size could have easily got out of hand and 
struggled to pass legislation. This resulted in stronger leadership and a more 
                                                 
37 Sitkoff, New Deal, 69-72 
38 Weiss, Farewell, 136 
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centralised chamber than the Senate, which was more flexible and where 
individual senators had greater influence. The House also tended to be the more 
conservative chamber, in part because of rural overrepresentation.39 
Legislation introduced in either chamber is first considered by the relevant 
committee and sub-committee, which then refer the measure back to the full 
chamber. If a committee does not refer a bill for consideration, the bill can go no 
further. In the House, the Rules Committee controls if and when a bill is brought 
to the floor. As the Senate is less centralised, this decision is worked out by the 
majority and minority party leaders as a “unanimous consent agreement”, the 
main purpose of which is to “limit floor debate and thus avoid a filibuster.”40 
House procedures, however, allow for a representative to circumvent the 
leadership by submitting a petition to discharge a bill from committee 
consideration. In 1935, the House leaders’ fear of more liberal members 
representing emerging interest groups, including African Americans, led them to 
increase the number of signatures required on a discharge petition from 145 to 
218, a simple majority.41 These differences between the two congressional 
chambers had a profound impact on the fate of the anti-lynching bills considered 
by the legislature during the New Deal, and an understanding of them is 
necessary in order examine the outcome of the campaign for anti-lynching 
legislation. 
                                                 
39 John Lees, The Political System of the United States, (London, 1975), 189-90 
40 Richard Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-
1980, (Madison, 1984), 234 
41 Patterson, Conservatism, 34 
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The NAACP’s anti-lynching drive set it at odds with white southern 
liberals, who maintained a paternalistic attitude towards race relations. The 
Association believed that the New Deal offered the best opportunity for many 
years to enact federal anti-lynching legislation, with Washington flooded with 
reformers and the federal government taking an increasingly active role in 
Americans’ everyday life. The expansion of the northern black population opened 
up the possibility of making northern politicians more sensitive to race issues, 
presenting African Americans with the chance to influence them at the polls. In 
pursuit of this goal, the Association turned to its liberal allies in the Senate, who 
proved unable—and unwilling—to surmount the formidable obstacle of the 










When the NAACP launched a new campaign for federal anti-lynching 
legislation in 1933, the Association decided to focus first on the Senate, where it 
claimed two recent successes in influencing national policy in favour of African 
Americans, and where it had two seasoned advocates willing to sponsor the 
legislation.42 Despite its relentless efforts throughout the New Deal years, no anti-
lynching measure was ever brought to a vote. Two failed attempts to end debate 
on a 1938 bill were the closest any legislation ever came to passing, but moderate 
Democrats, unwilling to sacrifice party unity over the issue, allied with 
conservative southern Democrats to kill the bill. Too few were willing to vote 
solely in accordance with their professed moral convictions and the emerging 
African-American vote was too small to exert the political pressure needed to 
inspire an effective attempt to overcome a well-organised southern filibuster. 
In late 1933, the NAACP recruited two leading liberal Democrats, Senators 
Edward Costigan of Colorado and Robert Wagner of New York, to sponsor their 
bill. Of the two, Costigan was less well-known at a national level, but had a 
history of supporting liberal reform, having represented the United Mine 
Workers in a bloody 1914 strike dispute and helped found the Colorado 
                                                 
42 Walter White to Edward Costigan, November 27, 1933, I:C233, NAACP Papers; 
Zangrando, NAACP, 115 
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Progressive party. He was a consistent supporter of the New Deal’s liberal 
legislative agenda.43 
Robert Wagner was a leading light in the urban-liberal strand of the new 
Democratic coalition. Born in Germany, Wagner emigrated to the United States 
at the age of eight, and after a career as a lawyer, state senator and New York 
Supreme Court justice, was elected to the United States Senate in 1926. During 
the New Deal, he was the driving force behind two of the era’s most significant 
laws, the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the 1937 Public Housing 
Act, and he was also involved in crafting the National Industrial Recovery Act and 
the Social Security Act. Wagner had long been the NAACP’s champion in the 
Senate, working with the Association on investigations into discrimination in the 
Mississippi flood-control project during his first term. In the 1930 debate on 
Judge John Parker’s Supreme Court nomination, he was the only senator to 
mention Parker’s alleged racial bias.44 
Costigan introduced the bill on January 4, 1934. The principle behind the 
measure was not to punish lynch-mob members themselves, but rather to 
penalise state officials for their frequent acquiescence to—or even complicity 
with—the mob. In his study, Arthur Raper estimated that “at least one-half of the 
lynchings are carried out with police officers participating, and that in nine-
tenths of the others the officers either condone or wink at the mob action.”45 
                                                 
43 Fred Greenbaum, ‘Edward Prentiss Costigan,’ American National Biography, 
Volume 5, (New York, 1999), 559-60 
44 Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban 
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45 Raper quoted in Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, (New York: 1944), 
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The Costigan-Wagner bill defined a mob as three or more people acting 
“without authority of law” with the aim of killing or injuring any person 
suspected, charged, or convicted of a crime. The legislation would only be 
invoked if a state or district failed to protect its citizens, on the grounds that the 
state had denied the victim due process of law and the equal protection of the 
law. State or local officials who failed to protect citizens or to pursue members of 
the mob would be liable for a fine of up to $5,000 and/or a five-year jail term. 
Officials found to have conspired with the mob would face five to twenty-five 
years’ imprisonment. A federal district court would take up the case only if, after 
thirty days, state and local law enforcement had failed to respond to the lynching. 
The most controversial clauses provided for the county in which the lynching 
occurred to be held liable for a fine of $10,000, to be paid to the victim or his or 
her relatives. If the victim was transported or taken through any other counties, 
they would be mutually liable for this fine.46 
After weeks of delay in which the Judiciary Committee appeared to be 
avoiding consideration of the bill, a Judiciary subcommittee, chaired by Frederick 
Van Nuys of Indiana, finally approved it on February 21, 1934, after two days of 
hearings. The testimony was broadcast on nationwide radio by NBC, an 
indication that lynching was intruding into mainstream, white America’s 
consciousness. In early April, the full, northern-dominated Judiciary Committee 
favourably reported the bill with two main amendments: the county fine could 
                                                 
46 S.24, January 4, 1934, I:C233, NAACP Papers. For its differences to the Dyer 
bill of 1922, see Rable, ‘Antilynching,’ 209. 
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range from $2,000 to $10,000, and the bill would only apply to victims taken 
from enforcement officers, which covered less than half the victims since 1918.47 
Over the next two months, the threat of a southern filibuster was enough 
to keep the measure off the floor. Despite pressure from the NAACP and its 
sponsors, Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson of Arkansas ignored the bill. 
Walter White met a number of times with Eleanor Roosevelt, who acted as his 
intermediary with her husband, to press for action from the administration. He 
finally secured a visit with the president in May, at which Roosevelt outlined his 
reasons for not endorsing anti-lynching legislation. With no pressure in favour of 
the bill from Roosevelt on the party leadership, the Senate adjourned in June 
with no action having been taken.48 
A similar situation prevailed in 1935. The Democrats had picked up nine 
seats in the November elections, taking their total to 69, compared with the 
Republicans’ 25. Seven of these seats were in states with a significant African-
American population.49 This did not translate directly into political power, 
however, as low levels of voter registration and political engagement among 
African Americans, along with manipulation of their vote, served to weaken their 
political leverage.50 
                                                 
47 Zangrando, NAACP, 118 
48 Weiss, Farewell, 104-6 
49 Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West 
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50 See Ralph Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR, 
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The Democratic party in most northern states was strongest in urban 
areas, where the black population was concentrated.51 While this increased 
blacks’ relative importance to party politics, city machines often controlled their 
vote. In Pennsylvania, Joseph Guffey promised African Americans ten percent of 
the state’s patronage and equity in relief in exchange for their votes; he was 
elected to the Senate in 1934. Other bosses copied Guffey’s successful model, 
including Tom Pendergast, Harry Truman’s patron, in Kansas City. Truman won 
election to his first Senate term in 1934 with the help of 88 percent of Missouri’s 
black vote.52 Their increased participation in politics did not always translate into 
long-term gains, as these senators were now safe for six years, with their election-
time promises to African Americans all-too-frequently forgotten. 
The NAACP publicised a barbaric lynching in late 1934 to demonstrate the 
continuing relevance of anti-lynching legislation. In October that year, a mob 
seized Claude Neal, a young, black Floridian accused of the murder of a local 
white woman, from the Alabama jail he had been taken to for his own safety, and 
returned him to Florida. In a lynching that had been announced days beforehand 
by local radio stations and newspapers, the mob burned, shot and mutilated his 
body during a long night of unspeakable brutality, before hanging his body from a 
courtyard tree in Marianna, Florida.53 Despite Neal having been taken across 
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state lines, the Justice Department refused to invoke the federal Lindbergh 
Kidnapping Act, as the lynch mob had not asked for a ransom. 
Public outrage over the Neal lynching, and calls for the passage of the 
Costigan-Wagner bill from white governors, clergy and intellectuals could not get 
Roosevelt to publicity endorse the measure, although through his wife he 
informed White that he was speaking privately with individual senators. “This 
was unquestionably true,” White agreed, “otherwise Senator Robinson as 
majority leader would never have permitted the bill to be taken up at all.”54 
Roosevelt’s endorsement was always unlikely in the 1935 session; the measure 
threatened his legislative priorities, including social security legislation, the 
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, and public utilities and banking bills, all of 
which were controversial in their own right.55 Wagner’s attention, meanwhile, 
was concentrated elsewhere, on his campaign for a NLRA.56  
When the bill finally reached the floor, it immediately provoked a filibuster 
by southern senators. Robinson moved to adjourn—thereby laying the bill aside—
three times, each of which failed to pass. Eventually, after six days, with the 
filibuster delaying more and more legislation, the motion to adjourn passed by 48 
votes to 32. The Republicans, hoping to delay the administration’s programme, 
opposed the motion by 18 to five, while only fourteen Democrats were against it.57 
No effort was made to break the filibuster through round-the-clock sessions or 
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calling a vote to end debate. The author of the first major history of filibusters 
was scathing: “The North had capitulated to the South.”58 
The position members of Congress take on various issues is usually 
determined by three main factors: their own attitude towards the issue or bill; 
their perception of their constituents’ feelings; and the preferences of their 
party.59 Opposition to anti-lynching legislation was largely based on the first two 
factors. Very few, Mississippi demagogue Theodore Bilbo and one or two others 
excepted, endorsed lynching even obliquely. Referring to an African-American 
journalist who supported the anti-lynching bill, Bilbo said if he dared to print his 
views in the south, “I doubt not that his mongrel carcass would mar the beauty of 
a southern magnolia tree.”60 Instead, most saw it as an infringement of state 
sovereignty, while other southern senators feared setting a precedent for federal 
interference in the region’s race relations. The more liberal—racially or 
otherwise—southern Democrats like Hugo Black could not jeopardise the support 
of their state party or constituents by not wholeheartedly opposing it.61 The bill’s 
opponents claimed its advocates sought only to appeal to their black constituents. 
This certainly motivated some, but their desire to eradicate summary justice was 
also an important element. The party had no explicit preference, but the 
president’s evident desire to maintain party unity was enough to push those 
moderate Democrats with no strong feeling either way to oppose the bill. 
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Its opponents and supporters both had a hand in the failure of the 
Costigan-Wagner anti-lynching bill of 1934 and 1935. Southern senators in 
positions of power made full use of Senate procedures to frustrate the bill at 
almost every turn. In contrast, its backers made only desultory efforts to 
overcome the determined group of filibusterers and they certainly got no help 
from Robinson. Most Democrats were unwilling to risk party unity and the 
coalition that had finally brought them to national power for a bill that benefited 
a small group of voters who generally continued to support the Republican party. 
In January 1936, Senator Van Nuys introduced a resolution to establish a 
Senate investigation into the fourteen lynchings that had occurred in the eight 
months since the filibuster of the Costigan-Wagner bill. Even the president was 
willing to back the idea. The investigation would publicise the failure of the states 
to prevent lynchings and take action against members of the mob, which could 
help the passage of a future anti-lynching measure.62 
Well-positioned southern opponents were again able to obstruct the 
measure. Although the Judiciary Committee favourably reported the resolution, 
it was then bottled up in another committee, where South Carolina’s James 
Byrnes and Nathan Bachman of Tennessee delayed a meeting on it, preventing 
even the $7,500 recommended by the Judiciary Committee for the investigation 
from being appropriated.63 The Van Nuys resolution, like the Costigan-Wagner 
bill before it, was finished. 
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In 1937 the Association tried again. With Edward Costigan having left the 
Senate because of ill-health, Van Nuys replaced him as co-sponsor.64 The signs 
augured well for the bill’s passage during the 75th Congress. The Democrats had 
swept the country in the 1936 elections, winning enough seats to theoretically be 
able to pass legislation with no southern Democrat or Republican support.65 The 
NAACP claimed support from almost 70 senators, easily enough to pass the 
measure if it came to a vote.66 Public opinion was also in the bill’s favour: a 
Gallup poll of January 1937 showed large majorities favouring anti-lynching 
legislation, even in the south.67 
Once again, however, political calculations at all levels of the government 
put paid to these hopes. The bill was far from the only controversial measure 
before the Senate in 1937 and 1938. Wagner was distracted by the campaign for 
his low-cost urban housing bill, which as the summer wore on was joined by the 
anti-lynching bill and Hugo Black’s Supreme Court nomination on the list of 
issues sure to stir sectional opposition. The president’s ‘court-packing’ plan, relief 
spending and a Fair Labor Standards bill all contributed to the emergence of a 
conservative coalition during the first session.68 The court fight in particular 
dented the bill’s chances. Rather than build on the momentum from the 
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successful House passage of the Gavagan bill, Van Nuys, who was vehemently 
opposed to the court plan, insisted that action on the anti-lynching bill be 
postponed until that bill had been dealt with. The administration, in turn, feared 
the inevitable anti-lynching filibuster would derail the court plan.69 
In these circumstances, it is likely that the Wagner-Van Nuys bill would 
have gone much the same way as its predecessors, had not Robinson dropped 
dead of a heart attack in the middle of the court-packing fight. His replacement 
was chosen in a close election that saw Roosevelt pulling the strings in favour of 
the more amenable Alben Barkley of Kentucky over Mississippi’s Pat Harrison, 
further riling the southern contingent.70 
The Judiciary Committee reported out the bill in June, but Congress still 
had to consider measures on minimum wages, low-cost housing, executive 
reorganisation, regional development and farming, and Barkley and the 
administration had no desire to see their ‘must’ legislation delayed by 
consideration of an anti-lynching bill. But with all sides seeking to escape the hot 
Washington summer at the end of a protracted, difficult session, Wagner 
outmanoeuvred the inexperienced Barkley on the Senate floor to make the anti-
lynching bill the first order of business when Congress reconvened.71 
Newspaper reports suggested that southern senators believed the 
legislation had enough support to pass and would offer only perfunctory 
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opposition, enough to satisfy their voters back home.72 In the event, at the special 
session called to deal with the recession in November, the bill provoked another 
six-day filibuster, which was only brought to an end by the farm bill’s eventual 
release from committee. None of the administration’s top-priority measures were 
enacted in this session, a clear indication of the strength of the coalescing 
conservative opposition. 
Nothing up to this point prepared the bill’s backers for the unprecedented 
six-week filibuster against it in January and February 1938. A relay of southern 
senators made interminable speeches, often to an almost empty chamber. 
Louisiana’s Allen Ellender emulated his predecessor Huey Long’s exploits by 
holding the floor for a record six days. Again the measure’s opponents—unlike its 
advocates—used Senate rules to full effect: Ellender and the other filibusterers 
were ably assisted by well-timed quorum calls and distinctly non-germane 
questions from their cooperators. Even after more than a week of debate Barkley 
was still only threatening a “gradual enforcement” of Senate rules.73 Tom 
Connally later conceded that continued night sessions would have broken the 
filibuster, but Barkley called only two during the six-week period. The vast 
majority of the time, senators did not even need to be in the chamber, and most 
days recessed at 5pm.74 
Robert Zangrando points to this as the main reason for the Senate’s failure 
to pass any anti-lynching bill, arguing that the bill’s advocates failed to make a 
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“genuine effort” to force a vote. He reports Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-
Michigan) as claiming that proponents of the bill never used the main weapon at 
their disposal, round-the-clock sessions with a quorum intact, to break the 
filibuster.75  
Although the party leadership did fail to make use of all the possible 
procedures in ending the filibuster, to cast Alben Barkley—a vulnerable senator 
from Kentucky—as a major proponent of an anti-lynching measure in an election 
year is to entirely misrepresent the situation.76 The party leadership, from 
Roosevelt and Garner down to Barkley and beyond, never favoured the 
legislation. They were never its advocates and did the bare minimum that was 
required. Another Republican, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., took a slightly different 
tack to Vandenberg. He told Walter White that “the attempt to break the 
filibuster has been weak, timid, vacillating and half-hearted…if the leadership 
was sincere…it could have brought [the] bill to [a] vote without invoking [the] gag 
rule.”77 The leadership were not actively opposed to its passage, but were 
unwilling to give it support because of the potential political ramifications. Walter 
White’s warnings about the importance of the black vote were not enough to 
counteract these fears. Barkley, as majority leader, had to follow the president’s 
programme, which did not include the Wagner-Van Nuys bill. 
This is not to say that the bill’s actual proponents—such as Wagner, 
Matthew Neely (D—W. Virginia) and Bennett Clark (D—Missouri) did as much as 
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they could. They made few speeches in support of the measure, for fear of 
lengthening the filibuster, which enabled the filibusterers to promote—and gain 
support for—their opposition.78 This strategy was misguided and as the days 
turned into weeks, with important economic legislation piling up, opinion turned 
against the bill.79 Still, it was Barkley, not the bill’s supporters, who controlled the 
debate proceedings. 
On the other hand, historian Harvard Sitkoff contrasts the behaviour of 
the bill’s supporters in 1938 with the “charade” of 1935 when both sides “went 
through the motions.”80 His positive opinion no doubt reflects his generally 
upbeat assessment of the impact of the New Deal on black Americans, but he is 
correct in noting the unprecedented attempt to twice invoke cloture. 
The rule for cloture—the mechanism by which Senate debate can be 
ended—in place during the New Deal years required an affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the senators present and voting. The first cloture vote was taken on 
January 27 and despite the professed support for the bill of well over 60 senators, 
the motion failed by 37 votes to 51. Along with all 22 southern senators, every 
Republican except Capper, who voted for it, and James Davis of Pennsylvania, 
who paired for it, opposed the motion. The remainder were eight western 
Democrats and a sprinkling of senators from the Midwest, north and border 
states.81 
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A second vote on February 16 fared slightly better, but at 46 to 42 against 
the bill, it was still short of even a simple majority, let alone the required 
supermajority.82 Capper was joined by fellow Republicans Davis and John 
Townsend of Delaware—who had evidently had a change of heart since telling a 
constituent after the first cloture vote that he was opposed to cloture because it 
might be used “sometime in the future on other legislation affecting the colored 
race.”83 Three Democrats also changed their vote from no to yes. After the second 
failed vote, the bill was eventually laid aside on February 21, to make way for an 
emergency relief appropriations bill. 
The filibusterers claimed that political expediency was behind the push for 
anti-lynching legislation. The New York Times argued that the votes were merely 
an opportunity for senators privately opposed to the bill to court the black vote by 
going on record as voting for it without it actually becoming law.84 The stronger 
push for the legislation, then, would have been because 1938, unlike 1935, was an 
election year. A remark by Harry Truman—a border state politician with a large 
black electorate—to a southern senator during the filibuster backs up this 
position: “You know I am against this bill, but if it comes to a vote, I’ll have to 
vote for it. All my sympathies are with you but the Negro vote in Kansas City and 
St. Louis is too important.”85 
Many of the other senators who supported the measure came from states 
with very small African-American populations, however. Capper, for instance, 
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was certainly motivated by moral conviction: a lifelong Quaker, he was also on 
the NAACP’s board of directors, and subsequently co-sponsored an anti-lynching 
bill in 1940.86 He could not be accused of cynical vote-catching as Kansas’s black 
population was insignificant in statewide politics, while Arizona’s few African 
Americans were clearly not what motivated Senator Ashurst to change his mind 
between the two votes. 
Throughout the filibuster newspapers reported that there was no chance 
for cloture to succeed, as too many of the Democrats pledged to support the 
measure in fact hoped to see it fail.87 New York Times commentator Arthur Krock 
claimed that many believed it be to unconstitutional, while “one or two 
disaffected Northern Democrats” hoped to embarrass the president. Only around 
six senators were “sincere, convinced advocates” of the bill.88 
The Democrats were consummate political animals, however, and while 
the black vote may not have been important to them all, many understood its 
importance to their colleagues and their party. As the debate dragged on, 
different concerns for their party won out over many senators’ desire to end 
lynching. Two weeks into the filibuster, a large group of northern Democrats 
indicated they were willing to displace the measure to move onto other matters, 
particularly if their votes were not recorded. “I do not want it said that the party 
cannot function,” Senator Pope of Idaho told the New York Times.89 Personal 
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ambitions were also a factor. Barkley, for one, had presidential aspirations, and 
was torn between his conservative state party and the need to appeal to the 
northern-dominated Democratic National Committee. Southerners, meanwhile, 
could pressure other senators with talk of favourable committee appointments.90 
Despite pledges of support for the bill from many Republican senators, 
minority leader Charles McNary led the Republicans in a stand against cloture. 
He claimed to be opposed to cloture on principle, as unlimited debate was the 
GOP’s final weapon in protecting its minority position. The NAACP quickly 
released his record on previous cloture votes, which showed he had voted for 
cloture—and signed cloture petitions—on numerous occasions.91 More likely is 
that McNary was simply playing politics, seeking to take advantage of the 
growing rift within the Democratic party, with little concern for the effect on 
African Americans. It was a strategy he had followed on other measures 
throughout the 75th Congress, and the longer the filibuster wore on, the more 
evident the divisions in the Democratic party became.92 
 Anti-lynching campaigners had worked hard to publicise the facts about 
lynchings, but were often unable to get past some politicians’ prejudices. Warren 
Austin (R—Vermont) believed the right of unlimited debate to be “a question of 
greater importance than the one raised by the Bill,” while George Norris (I—
Nebraska) felt anti-lynching legislation was not required because southerners 
had every “right to be proud” of their record since Reconstruction, and he feared 
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any such legislation would raise again the “agonizing animosities” that marred 
the years following the Civil War.93 
Most opposition to federal anti-lynching legislation was based on states’ 
rights, and non-southern opponents of the bill, most notably William Borah (R—
Idaho), were against it on the grounds that it granted more power to the federal 
government. Events in Europe and Roosevelt’s perceived dictatorial tendencies 
lent this view particular significance during the 1938 filibuster. The anti-lynching 
bill also gave southern opponents of the New Deal an opportunity to indirectly 
attack northern Democrats, without criticising measures that benefited their 
states and had their constituents’ support.94 
The Senate failed to enact federal anti-lynching legislation for much of the 
1930s because southern dominance of the chamber prevented full consideration 
of various measures put before it. By 1938, the Senate’s political complexion had 
changed enough that passage appeared possible, with a growing number of 
liberal politicians and those representing black constituents. These hopes were in 
vain, however, as overreaching by the administration turned the Senate, and the 
country, away from further liberal reform. 
There were sincere politicians—Capper and Costigan, for example—whose 
moral repugnance of lynching led them to support the cause despite there being 
little electoral incentive to do so. But political considerations shaped most 
senators’ behaviour, and the African-American vote was not organised or 
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significant enough to inflict serious political retribution on politicians who 
otherwise had nothing to gain, or something to lose, from its passage. Ultimately, 
moderate Democrats, including the president, were unwilling to risk splitting the 
cross-sectional coalition that had brought them to national power, for the sake of 
legislation for black Americans.  
Given Roosevelt’s waning influence by 1938, it is open to question whether 
his support would have made enough difference, although he could have 
pressured Barkley to make a stronger effort to break the filibuster. The anti-
lynching bills faced a two-fold problem: the bill’s opponents felt much more 
strongly about the issue than its supporters did, and the Democratic leadership 
was never sincere in its support for the bill, whether Barkley read senators the 
“riot act” or not.95 
The black vote had greater, though far more concentrated, impact in 
elections for the House of Representatives than the Senate. African Americans 
did not hold the balance of power in a majority of House districts, so the 
argument that support for any anti-lynching measure was nothing but a cynical 
appeal to the northern black electorate just does not hold up when looking at the 
chamber that gave anti-lynching campaigners their sole congressional success: 
the House. 
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In 1935, a friendly AFL lobbyist, Mike Flynn, advised Walter White against 
introducing a bill in the House because of the staunch opposition of Texan 
Hatton Sumners, chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Flynn told White that 
only a high-impact campaign would overcome this obstacle, involving increased 
grassroots pressure on individual congressmen, and the Association encouraging 
legislators to introduce anything from 60 to 100 anti-lynching bills, with a few 
representatives then calling for a caucus demanding that the bill be discharged 
from the Judiciary Committee and brought to a vote.96 White followed this 
advice, deciding to again focus the NAACP’s energies on the Senate; it did not 
launch a sustained push for House passage until 1936 and 1937. 
The House proved to be far more favourable to the legislation than the 
Senate and the bill’s sponsors twice secured House passage during the Roosevelt 
years, despite a strong conservative leadership hostile to anti-lynching 
legislation. The African-American vote had a more direct impact on members of 
the House, but the chamber’s rules also enabled anti-lynching supporters to 
bypass the opposition far more easily than in the Senate. 
Joseph A. Gavagan, a Democrat representing Harlem, New York, was the 
NAACP’s chief ally in the House. He sponsored numerous anti-lynching bills 
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throughout his House career, motivated by a combination of personal conviction 
and political calculation. Gavagan was always keen to have his contribution 
recognised, going on nationwide speaking tours with White to promote the 
campaign, for instance. After the House had passed his bill, and it was being 
considered by the Senate during the special session of the winter of 1937, he 
complained to White about the “studied effort” to “take credit away from” him 
after press reports referred to the measure as the Wagner-Van Nuys bill.97 
He first introduced an NAACP-sponsored bill in the House in 1935, at a 
time when the Costigan-Wagner bill was before the Senate for the second time, 
but the proposal languished with the Judiciary Committee for more than a year 
with no action being taken. Although the Judiciary Committee itself was 
somewhat better disposed to the legislation than the House as a whole, chairman 
Sumners was adamantly against the measure. He had previously announced that 
he would never permit action in favour of any anti-lynching measure.98 
The NAACP initially requested that the Democratic leadership call a 
caucus to endorse the bill, but came up against numerous obstacles in their 
attempt. White received reports that the leaders had pressured individual 
representatives not to sign the caucus petition, then, once he had secured well 
over the necessary 25 signatures, the leadership twice refused to accept it on 
spurious grounds. Even Thomas Ford (D-California), an assistant majority whip 
who had sponsored another anti-lynching bill that session, urged White to drop 
the petition because of conflicting pressures, which trumped the need to appeal 
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to African Americans. The caucus finally met in late May 1936, but was prevented 
from doing anything because the leaders decided that the 65 Democrats present 
did not constitute a quorum. A discharge petition was eventually submitted in 
mid-June, but by this point it was too late for the bill to be considered before 
adjournment.99 
Once the NAACP decided to direct greater attention and resources to 
House passage in the 75th Congress, however, events moved relatively swiftly. On 
February 19, 1937, Gavagan, frustrated with the Judiciary Committee’s refusal to 
consider his bill, tried to force the Rules Committee to act. But under the 
chairmanship of John O’Connor of New York, the committee was a conservative 
thorn in the New Deal’s side, happy to obstruct administration measures, let 
alone bills like Gavagan’s that were unsupported by most of the Democratic 
leadership.100 In early March, Gavagan filed a petition to discharge the measure 
from both the Judiciary and Rules committees.101 
Gavagan’s petition was the only one of 27 filed during that session to be 
signed by a majority of members, a sign of support for the bill among northern 
legislators.102 To head off this threat, Sumners overcame his steadfast opposition 
to anti-lynching bills to report out a far-weaker bill sponsored by the sole black 
member of Congress, Arthur Mitchell of Illinois. Zangrando has succinctly 
compared the Gavagan and Mitchell’s bills: “The Mitchell bill applied only to  
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victims seized from official custody; the Gavagan bill covered all 
instances of mob violence against life and person. For officials 
found guilty of conspiring or cooperating with the mob, the Mitchell 
bill proposed imprisonment from two to ten years; the Gavagan bill 
carried a term of from five to twenty-five years. While Mitchell’s bill 
remained silent about initial federal jurisdiction, Gavagan’s invoked 
action by the United States District Court thirty days after the 
crime, if state and local officials had failed to respond. The Mitchell 
bill provided only for a $2,000 to $10,000 fine on the county of 
death; Gavagan’s version held both the county of abduction and the 
county of death liable. Finally, unlike Mitchell’s the Gavagan bill 
explicitly exempted from creditors’ claims any damages assessed 
against the county(s) on behalf of the victim’s survivors.”103 
 
The NAACP was outraged at this attempt to rush the “emasculated, 
ineffective and virtually worthless” Mitchell bill through the House, charging that 
it would be “bitterly resented” by supporters of anti-lynching legislation.104 
Sumners later told White “quite frankly that he had not believed that the 
[NAACP] would have the nerve to oppose passage of a bill introduced by the one 
Negro member of Congress.”105 
The discharge petition with all 218 signatures was submitted on March 29 
and the start of debate scheduled for April 12. The Judiciary Committee, 
meanwhile, favourably reported the Mitchell bill on March 31, having only 
decided to hold hearings on it a week earlier, and arranged for discussion to begin 
on April 7.106 In this way, Sumners hoped to forestall the Gavagan bill. 
On April 7, by a 257 to 123 vote, the House refused to consider the Mitchell 
bill.107 A few days later, discussion of Gavagan’s proposal began. As in the Senate, 
opposition to the bill generally focused on the constitutional question of the 
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federal government’s right to intervene with the police powers of the states, but it 
was not always carried out on a particularly high plane. John Rankin (D—
Mississippi) fulminated that it was “a bill to encourage Negroes to think they can 
rape white women”, while Edward Cox of Georgia voiced fears that became ever-
more familiar as the years went on: “It is an attempt to break the spirit of the 
white South and in time bring about social equality.”108 
The blowtorch lynchings in Mississippi as the House debated the bill 
forcefully underscored to legislators the need for anti-lynching legislation, and 
two days later, on April 15, they passed the Gavagan bill by 277 votes to 120, with 
the chamber split along sectional lines.109 Living up to his name, Maury Maverick 
of Texas was the sole southern Democrat to vote for the measure, while 
Tennessee’s two Republican representatives were the only other southerners to 
support it. Frank Boykin of Alabama apparently favoured the bill but could not 
openly support it because of the potential political consequences in his home 
state; he paired against it.110 The bill had so riled most southern Democrats than 
the Speaker, William Bankhead (D—Alabama), took the unusual step of recording 
his opposition to it. A slight majority in the border states, and a vast majority in 
every other section of the country, voted in favour of the bill. The yes vote crossed 
party lines, with all the Progressives and Farmer-Laborites voting it, unlike in the 
Senate. Just 28 of 220 non-southern Democrats voted or paired against it; 
sixteen of them came from districts in the border states. Seventy-five of the 
House’s 88 Republicans also voted in favour.  
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The Duck Hill lynching was one important factor in the bill’s successful 
House passage. It even seemed to have affected Sumners’ position. White reports 
him as remarking that “maybe we will have to have an anti-lynching bill after all,” 
after the news was read to Congress.111 The bill’s Senate advocates were not able 
to make use of the revulsion towards Duck Hill in the same way because of the 
delay in Senate consideration caused by the court-packing plan. Bennett Clark 
(D—Missouri) pinned a placard to the Senate bulletin board with photos of the 
lynching victims and the caption: “There have been No Arrests, No Indictments, 
and No Convictions of Any One of the Lynchers. This was NOT a rape case.”112 It 
greatly angered the southerners, but its impact was diminished by the time the 
filibuster was underway.  
In the House, grassroots pressure from African-American constituents—
and fear of repercussions at the polls—had greater impact than it did on senators. 
Gavagan’s need to appeal to his district certainly prompted him to work so 
resolutely for the legislation. As election campaigns got underway the year after 
House passage, White received many requests from congressmen asking that he 
provide a letter of recommendation detailing their involvement in the campaign 
for anti-lynching legislation.113 
Nevertheless, the concentration of the northern black population in major 
urban centres restricted their influence to those representing big cities, with a few 
exceptions, so political expediency alone does not explain the repeated success of 
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anti-lynching legislation in the House. Members were motivated not just by their 
own re-election needs, but the wish to cement African Americans into the 
burgeoning New Deal coalition far into the future. 
In some respects, House passage would seem less likely than Senate 
passage. Legislative malapportionment meant rural areas were overrepresented 
in the House. In 1930, the proportion of the population that lived in urban areas 
was 56.2 percent, while only 46 percent of seats were in urban districts.114 James 
Patterson’s study of congressional conservatives during the New Deal found that 
representatives from rural districts tended to be more conservative than those 
representing urban areas.115 Rural representatives also had far fewer black 
constituents, reducing their electoral incentive to favour anti-lynching bills. Anti-
lynching did have the advantage, however, of having a particular appeal to 
northerners in a way that the other issues affecting African Americans did not. 
Northern politicians’ perception that lynching was a southern phenomenon 
meant that dealing with it did not impinge on economic factors or social customs 
in their own region, so they could more easily be affected by their moral 
abhorrence towards it. 
The Republican party’s strategy in the House was different from the one 
McNary pursued in the Senate. Some wanted to embarrass Roosevelt’s 
government by siding with liberal northern Democrats to pass a bill the 
administration did not favour.116 Others hoped to return the black vote to the 
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Republicans. In any case, even without their votes, the measure still would have 
passed. In contrast, cloture could not have been invoked in the Senate without 
the support of at least two Republicans, even had all 54 non-southern Democrats, 
the Farmer-Laborites and La Follette voted for it. 
The discharge petition rule allowed the bill’s sponsors to circumvent the 
party leadership to bring the bill to a vote. Without it, the measure would have 
got nowhere because, as Gavagan later explained, he “got very little active 
support from the White House in the first or second term.”117 The upper 
chamber’s less formal procedures and more consensual customs, as well as the 
right to filibuster, made it much harder to get past an indifferent party leadership 
there. 
Gavagan’s position was also different to Costigan, Wagner or Van Nuys’s. 
Not only was the significance of the black vote in Harlem a powerful motivating 
force, but also, as a representative, he dealt with fewer assignments so could 
dedicate more of his time and resources to the bill. The size of the House makes 
passage easier and given the two-to-one majority favouring the bill, individual 
representatives’ votes were less significant, so vote trading and southerners’ 
chance to influence other members was less important. 
Once it came to the floor, the House debate on the bill took a few days. As 
it was not subject to a lengthy filibuster, no legislation got bottled up behind it, so 
any equivocating legislators could not claim that the bill was jeopardising 
‘emergency measures’ to withdraw their support. The need to invoke cloture in 
the Senate enabled those senators whose support was half-hearted to fall back on 
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arguments about fundamental principles to avoid the issue, which again was not 
possible in the House. Nonetheless, undoubtedly some of those who voted for the 
bill in the House never expected it to get through the Senate, but the House vote 
gave them and their party the opportunity to reap the full political reward for 
their support. 
 The House considered the bill in 1937, at a time when the various issues 
that flared tempers in the Senate had not yet reached the lower chamber. The 
court bill, for one, never made it out of the Senate, while Wagner’s housing bill 
and relief appropriations were considered after the Gavagan bill had been 
passed.118 This calmer atmosphere contributed to the bill’s success. 
 The confluence of greater commitment to the bill engendered by a greater 
electoral motivation, and external factors such as the gruesome lynching at Duck 
Hill and the lack of other competing pressures in 1937, as well as institutional 
differences between the two chambers, eased passage of the Gavagan anti-
lynching bill through the House. Ultimately, though, success there was worthless 
without a similar achievement in the Senate and that proved impossible to 
achieve given the decision moderate Democrats came to about the priorities they 
faced during the New Deal. 
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